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Abstract
This paper considers whether at money can be provided by a revenue-maximizing
monopolist in an environment where money is essential. Two questions arise con-
cerning the private supply of money: Is it feasible and is it optimal? Concerning
the feasibility question, I show that the revenue-maximizing policy is time-consistent
if the trading history of the issuer is public information and if money demanders
respond to the revelation of defection by playing autarky. Concerning the optimality
question, the model suggests that any private organization of the market for at
currency is suboptimal.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers whether at money can be provided by a revenue-maximizing mo-
nopolist in an environment where money is essential.1 Two questions arise concerning the
private supply of money: Is it feasible and is it optimal? Concerning the feasibility ques-
tion, I show that the revenue-maximizing policy is time-consistent if the trading history
of the issuer is public information and if money demanders respond to the revelation of
defection by playing autarky. Concerning the optimality question, the model suggests that
any private organization of the market for at currency is suboptimal.
The existence of a monetary equilibrium relies on two features that rule out the time-
inconsistency problem: public knowledge of the monopolists trading history and the exis-
tence of punishment strategies that credibly eliminate any future prots of the monopolist
if executed. Public knowledge of the issuers trading history is needed to trigger the pun-
ishment strategies if the monopolist deviates from the announced policy. The credibility
of the punishment strategies guarantees that it is optimal to use them if the monopolist
deviates. The notion that the market can discipline private issuers of at currency goes
back at least to von Hayek (1976, S. 30) who conjectured that the slightest suspicion that
the issuer was abusing his position when issuing money would lead to a depreciation of its
value and would at once drive him out of business. It would make him lose what might be
an extremely protable kind of business.
Thus, as suggested by von Hayek (1976), punishment strategies e¤ectively eliminate
the time-inconsistency problem. The equilibrium allocation, however, is suboptimal. The
reason is that the rst-best allocation requires a deation which is not consistent with
1By essential I mean that the use of money expands the set of allocations (Kocherlakota (1998) and
Wallace (2001)).
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positive prots once the initial stock of money is sold since only positive ination rates
generate the expected prots that make the monopolist willing to adhere to his announced
sequence of money supplies.
The monetary equilibrium is characterized as follows: Initially, the monopolist an-
nounces the entire sequence of future money supplies and then o¤ers to exchange the
initial stock of money for real commodities. Agents accept the initial o¤er because there is
no record, as yet, about the monopolists past play. In each subsequent period, each agent
accepts monetary exchanges (goods for money) from other agents and from the monopolist
if and only if the monopolist has not deviated from the announced money supply sequence.
Thus, if any deviation occurs, each agent refuses to produce for money today and, in fact,
in the future. For each agent it is optimal to respond to the revelation of defection by
playing autarky if all other agents respond likewise. Accordingly, the monopolist cannot
gain by defection, and, therefore, accepting money in the initial period is a best response.
The model of this paper is based on Shis (1997, 1999) random-matching model with
divisible money and divisible real commodities. In Shis model, the money supply is ex-
ogenously given; one contribution of this paper, therefore, is to endogenize the supply of
money in the random-matching model with divisible money. The paper is related to sev-
eral papers that study the private supply of money. Random-matching models include
Cavalcanti, Erosa and Temzelides (1999), Ritter (1995), Williamson (1999) and Martin
and Schreft (2003). They all study environments with indivisible money and an exogenous
upper bound on individual money holdings. I dispense with these assumptions and allow
agents to carry any non-negative amount of fully divisible money. Nonrandom matching
models include Calvo (1978), Klein (1975), and Taub (1985).
Because of their treatment of the time-inconsistency problem, the models of Cavalcanti
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and Wallace (1999a) and Ritter (1995) are of special relevance for this paper. Cavalcanti
and Wallace (1999a) assume that trading histories of bankers, who issue distinguishable
inside monies, are public knowledge, and they show that this knowledge is su¢ cient to
rule out the time-inconsistency problem. They derive the incentive-feasible allocation that
maximizes the nonbanking sectors welfare and show that this allocation requires note
issue and redemption by the bankers. In Ritters (1995) model a subset of the population
belongs to a coalition that issues at money. The sequence of money supplies is chosen
to maximize the coalition members discounted utility from trading with nonmembers.
He shows that the coalition is able to promise credibly to limit the issue of money if the
coalitions involvement in the economy is su¢ ciently large and if its members are su¢ ciently
patient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 an adapted version of Shis
(1997, 1999) model is presented; Section 3 considers the monopolists revenue-maximizing
sequence of money supplies when binding money supply announcements are feasible and
when they are not feasible. Section 4 discusses the results and some extensions, and Section
5 concludes.
2 Demand
Money demand arises in the search-theoretic model of monetary exchange where money
is used to alleviate the double coincidence of real wants problem. The model builds on
Shi (1997, 1999), who extended the search-theoretic approach developed by Kiyotaki and
Wright (1991, 1993) to allow for divisible money and divisible goods.2 While in Shis model
2Lagos and Wright (2005) propose an alternative framework to incorporate fully divisible money in
the search-theoretic approach to monetary economics. The relation between Shis and Lagos and Wrights
approach is discussed in Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003). How both frameworks relate to the rst-
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the supply of money is exogenously given, this paper considers the supply decision of a
revenue-maximizing monopolist. Before discussing the monopolists supply decision, let
me describe Shis model. There are H > 2 types of households. Each type consists of a
large number of households with measure 1=H. An arbitrary household of type h 2 H is
referred to as household h. Decision variables of household h are denoted by lower-case
letters. Capital-case letters denote other householdsvariables, which are taken as given by
household h. Each household type is specialized in consumption and production as follows:
a household of type hproduces commodity h+1 and consumes commodity h (mod H), for
h = 1; ::; H.
Households cannot commit to future actions, and each households trading history
with other households is private information to the household. Because H > 2, these
assumptions rule out any barter exchange for optimizing agents. The only storable object
is a perfectly divisible and intrinsically useless object called money.
Each household consists of a continuum of members normalized to one, who carry
out di¤erent tasks but regard the households utility as the common objective. Household
members are grouped into money holders (buyers) and producers (sellers), each performing
one task at a time. A buyer attempts to exchange money for consumption goods, and
a seller attempts to produce goods for money. The fraction of buyers is given by the
exogenous constant B.3 Time is discrete and household members are randomly matched
in pairs in each period where the probability that a seller meets an appropriate buyer (a
buyer of household h+ 1 who holds money) is zB, and the probability that a buyer meets
an appropriate seller is z (1 B) where z  1=H.
generation search models of indivisible money is analyzed in Berentsen and Rocheteau (2002).
3Shi (1997, 1999) also allows households to choose the fraction of buyers B in each period. To focus
on the central issue of the paper, the problem of an optimal money supply sequence is examined when the
fraction of buyers is given.
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At the beginning of each period, the household has mt units of money and chooses a
uniform consumption level for each member, ct, and the next periods money stock, mt+1.
The household then divides evenly the money stock among its buyers so that each buyer
holds mt=B units of money in a match and species the trading strategies for its members.
After this, the agents are matched and carry out their exchanges according to the described
strategies. Thereafter, members bring back their receipts of goods and money, and each
member consumes ct units of goods. At the end of a period, the household receives money
transfer  t and carries the stock mt+1 to t+ 1.
Household utility in a period is given by u (c)   ky where c is the quantity of goods
consumed, y is the quantity of goods produced, and k is the marginal cost of production
where k > 0. The function u is dened on [0;1), is increasing, three times di¤erentiable,
and satises u (0) = 0; u00 < 0, u0 (0) = 1 and 2u00 (c) + cu000 (c) < 0.4 The household
discounts future utility with the discount factor  2 (0; 1).
Denote !t the households period t + 1 marginal value of money, discounted to period
t. For the sake of simplicity, assume that a buyer who meets an appropriate seller makes
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the seller, and the seller accepts it if made no worse o¤ by
accepting. The take-it-or-leave-it o¤er is the pair (qt; xt), where qt is the quantity of goods
produced by the seller for xt units of money. If the seller accepts the o¤er, the acquired
money balances xt will add to the households money balances at the beginning of period
t+1, whose value is 
txt. The cost associated with this trade is kqt and the seller accepts
the o¤er if xt
t  kqt. Thus, any optimal o¤er satises
xt
t = kqt. (1)
4The last assumption guarantees that the rst-order condition of the monopolist represents a maximum.
It is satised, for example, by the utility function u (c) = c, where 0 <  < 1.
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Because a buyer cannot exchange more money than he has, the o¤er (qt; xt) satises
xt  mt=B. (2)
A households trading strategy consists of the pair (qt; xt) for each buyer, and the
numbers t 2 f0; 1g and mt 2 f0; 1g for each seller. Given the o¤er (Qt; Xt) by a buyer of
another household, the seller decides either to accept (t = 1) or to reject (t = 0). Sellers
also receive o¤ers to produce for money from the monopolist (details are specied in the
next section), which the sellers accept (mt = 1) or reject (
m
t = 0). For each period, the
household chooses (mt+1;ct; qt; xt), and (t; mt ) to solve the following maximizing problem:
max
1X
t=0
t [u (ct)  t] (3)
subject to (1), (2), and
ct  z (1 B)Btqt (4)
t = z (1 B)BktQt + f (mt  t) (5)
mt+1  mt  mt  t + z (1 B)BtXt   z (1 B)Btxt (6)
mt+1  0
The variables taken as given in the above problem are the state variable mt and other
householdschoices. Inequality (4) species the households consumption. With probability
z (1 B), a buyer meets an appropriate seller and he receives tqt units of goods. Because
B is the measure of buyers per household, z (1 B)Btqt represents the total quantity
of consumption goods acquired by the household. Equation (5) species the households
cost of producing for other households and for the issuer. The rst term on the right-
hand side is the households cost of producing for other households. A seller meets with
probability zB an appropriate buyer and produces tQt units of goods at cost ktQt.
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As the fraction of sellers is (1 B), total cost for the household is z (1 B)BktQt.
The second term species the households cost of producing for the monopolist. If the
monopolist sells mt  t units of additional currency to the household, total cost to the
household is f (mt  t) (details are specied in the next section). In Shis (1997, 1999)
models, households receive additional money through lump-sum transfers. Accordingly in
Shis models f (mt  t) = 0 and 
m
t = 1. Inequality (6) species the law of motion of the
households money balance. The rst term on the right-hand side species the additional
currency the household acquires from the monopolist, the second term species sellers
money receipts when selling goods, and the third term species buyers expenses when
exchanging money for goods.
To simplify the problem, note the following: First, inequality (6) must hold with equal-
ity if money is valued in the future. Second, inequality (4) holds with equality, given the
households preferences; therefore, ct can be substituted by the equality of (4) throughout
the problem. Third, by the equation (1), xt can be substituted throughout the problem.
Fourth, the other householdschoices (Qt; Xt) satisfy a condition similar to equation (1).
Thus, a household gets a nonnegative surplus when selling; therefore, t = t = 1 in a
monetary equilibrium.5
After substituting ct, xt, and t, the remaining choice is qt. Let t be the shadow
price of inequality (2), expressed in period-t utility. Then, if u0 (ct) =
@u(ct)
@ct
, the envelope
condition for mt and the rst order condition for qt are as follows:
!t = 

!t+1 + z (1 B)t+1

(7)
u0 (ct) =
k (!t + t)

t
(8)
Equation (7) is the optimality condition for mt. It states that the marginal cost of ac-
5There exists a nonmonetary equilibrium with t = t = 0.
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quiring money today, !t, equals the discounted marginal benet of money tomorrow, !t+1,
plus the discounted marginal benet of relaxing future cash constraints, z (1 B)t+1.
Equation (8) states that, for a buyer in a desirable match, the marginal utility of con-
sumption must equal the opportunity cost of the amount of money that must be paid to
acquire additional goods. To buy another unit of a good, the buyer must give up k

t
units
of money (see eq. (1)). Increasing the monetary payment has two costs to the buyer. He
gives up the future value of money !t and he faces a tighter constraint (2). Together, !t
and t measure the marginal cost of obtaining a larger quantity of goods in exchange.
Denition 1 A symmetric monetary equilibrium is a sequence of households choices
(mt+1; ct;qt; xt; t)
1
t=0, the implied shadow prices (!t; t)
1
t=0, and other householdschoices
such that
(i) given other householdschoices and shadow prices, each households choices solve the
dynamic programming problem (3);
(ii) choices and shadow prices are the same across households;
(iii)  t = mt+1  mt = (   1)mt,  > 0.
The rst part of the denition requires that each household choose a best response
against other household choices. Part (ii) states that the equilibrium is a symmetric solu-
tion to such best response correspondences, and part (iii) species the exogenously given
sequence of money supplies, where  is the gross growth rate of money. In a symmetric
equilibrium, lower-case variables equal capital-case variables and are replaced by the corre-
sponding capital-case variables. Then, equations (7) and (8) give a single condition, which
the monopolist takes into account when choosing the sequence of money supplies:

t = 
t+1

1 + z (1 B) u
0 (ct+1)  k
k

(9)
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If the gross growth rate of money is constant (see Shi 1997, 1999), the equilibrium
quantity produced in a single-coincidence meeting is the value of Q that solves
u0 [z (1 B)BQ] = k

z (1 B) + =   1
z (1 B)

. (10)
Denote this value by Q. Then in a symmetric monetary equilibrium, in each period
the buyers make the o¤er (Q; Xt ), which the sellers accept. In this model, money is
neutral as the nominal quantity of money does not a¤ect real production. However, money
is not superneutral. This can be seen from equation (10), which implies that Q is strictly
decreasing in .
3 Supply
Money is o¤ered to the households by a single issuer. The issuer consists of a large number
of members called money agents, and the number of members is such that the issuer can
assign one member to each seller of each household. Memberspreferences for goods are
symmetric among goods and satisfy u (Qm) = Qm, where Qm is the quantity of goods
consumed. Money agents cannot produce real commodities; rather, they have the technol-
ogy that permits them to create at no cost, a divisible, durable, and intrinsically useless
object called money. Since they cannot produce real commodities no note redemption by
the monopolist is feasible. As in Ritter (1995), the sequence of money supplies is chosen
to maximize the organizations joint discounted utility from trading with nonmembers.
Because all money agents are identical and their preferences are linear, this is equal to
maximizing the expected discounted utility of a representative money agent.6
6The linear utility for the members of the monopolist household implies that the monopolist has no
interest to smooth consumption across time. This creates a strong incentive to overissue money today since
the marginal utility is not decreasing. Therefore, if my punishment strategies can discipline the monopolist
for a linear utility function, they should also work for a strictly concave utility function.
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Binding announcements I rst consider the utility-maximizing policy when binding
announcements are feasible and, thereafter, I consider nonbinding supply announcements.
In each case each period is divided into two subperiods. At the beginning of a period,
household members meet randomly in pairs and carry out their trades; at the end of a
period, the issuer assigns one member to each seller of each household, and each money
agent makes the same take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (Qmt ; X
m
t ), where Q
m
t is the quantity of goods
produced by the seller for Xmt units of money. In the initial period, t = 0, the monopolist
announces the entire sequence of o¤ers fQmt ; Xmt g1t=0 and households choose their trading
strategies. After the announcement the money agents sell the initial stock of nominal
balances to the households through the o¤ers (Qm0 ; X
m
0 ).
Given a sequence of o¤ers fQmt ; Xmt g1t=0, the expected discounted lifetime utility of
a money agent is
P1
t=0 
tQmt . The analysis is simplied by noting that controlling this
sequence is equivalent to controlling the sequence of nominal money supplies fMtg1t=1.7 To
see this, note that if a seller accepts the o¤er (Qmt ; X
m
t ), the acquired money balances X
m
t
will add to the households money balances at the beginning of period t + 1, whose real
value is 
tXmt . The cost associated with this trade is kQ
m
t , and the households surplus
is 
tXmt   kQmt . The seller accepts the o¤er if 
tXmt  kQmt . Thus, any optimal o¤er
satises

tX
m
t = kQ
m
t . (11)
Given (11), the lifetime utility of a money agent can be expressed as
P1
t=0 k
 1t
tXmt .
If money agents o¤er (Qmt ; X
m
t ), households acquire Mt+1   Mt = (1   B)Xmt units of
7Throughout the paper I focus on symmetric equilibria where all households are treated equaly that
is, each household receives the same take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. Note, however, deviations from such a policy
may involve asymmetric o¤ers. Given this, if all households are treated symmetrically, the control of the
sequence of take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers is equivalent to the control of the sequence of money supplies fMtg1t=1,
which in equilibrium equals the sequence of the stocks of money held by each household, fmtg1t=1.
11
additional currency in each period. Accordingly, the monopolists problem (thereafter
called PM) is to choose the sequence of nominal money supplies fMtg1t=1 that maximizes
1X
t=0
k 1 (1 B) 1 t (Mt+1  Mt) 
t (12)
subject to the demand conditions (9), and
Mt+1  Mt  0. (13)
Several comments are in order here. First, inequality (13) expresses the fact that
money agents cannot redeem money. Second, it also highlights a key di¤erence between
public and private issuers: Private issuers have no ability to tax agentsmoney balances
whereas public issuers, at least in principal, have that power. This is why a private issuer
cannot run the Friedman rule, which would require  =  < 1. Third, the sequence of
real revenues f(Mt+1  Mt) 
tg1t=0 is homogenous of degree zero in the sequence fMtg1t=1.
Thus, a proportional change in the money supply sequence has no e¤ect on the sequence
of real revenues. This is a consequence of the neutrality of money, which is a property of
Shis (1997, 1999) divisible money model used here. Third, and related to the previous
point, if a sequence fMtg1t=1 solves PM , any sequence fMtg1t=1,  > 0, is a solution to
PM .
Finally, PM can be further simplied by noting that the control of fMtg1t=1 is equivalent
to the control of the sequence of householdsconsumption fctg1t=0. To see this, multiply
equation (9) by Mt+1 to get
Mt+1
t = Mt+1
t+1

1 + z (1 B) u
0 (ct+1)  k
k

and substitute this expression into the monopolists objective function. This and equation
(1) yield the modied objective
12
1X
t=0
t
z (1 B)2

ct+1

1 + z (1 B) u
0 (ct+1)  k
k

  ct

(14)
Maximization of (14) with respect to consumption ct yields the rst-order conditions
c0 = 0 (15)
u0 (ct) + ctu00 (ct) = k, t > 0 (16)
According to equation (15), in the initial period, the monopolist destroys the value of
any old currency (c0 = 0) and issues a new money.8 Thereafter, by equation (16), the issuer
earns seigniorage income by taxing (by selling additional units of money) the outstanding
stock of money by a constant gross growth rate of money, . To derive , denote ct the
value of ct that solves equation (16) and note that (16) implies that ct = c is constant. If
ct is constant, the householdsrst-order condition (9) implies that t =  where  is the
value of  that solves
u0 (c) = k

z (1 B) + =   1
z (1 B)

. (17)
Next, note from (16) that u0 (c) > k, which from (17) implies that  > . Shi (1997) shows
that the Friedman rule (i.e.,  = ) maximizes the utility of the households. Thus, not
surprisingly, the monopolists desire for seigniorage income induces him to have too much
ination from the householdspoint of view. For certain parameter values, the solutions to
the rst-order conditions (16) and equation (17) involve deation, which violates condition
(13).9 Proposition 1, which takes this condition into account, characterizes the revenue-
maximizing policy of the monopolist when binding announcements are feasible.
8Without a medium of exchange (M0 = 0) households do not consume in the initial period because they
cannot trade. Although M0 = 0 is the maintained assumption, I have set up a more general maximization
problem which allows for M0 > 0. If M0 > 0, the optimal policy is to make the initial stock of money
worthless (e.g., by announcing to sell an innite amount of the old money) and then to issue a new money.
9Deation is more likely the atter the curvature of the utility function. Note further that  is
increasing in , in the single coincidence probability z, and in the fraction of sellers, 1 B.
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Proposition 1 There exists a critical value 1, dened in the proof, such that the following
is true: If   1, the sequence fc0 = 0; ct = cg1t=1 solves PM where c is the value of c that
solves (16). If  < 1, PM is solved by the sequence fc0 = 0; ct = ecg1t=1 where ec is dened
in the proof. In terms of the associated sequence of money supplies if   1, the sequence
fMt = t 1M1g1t=1 solves PM where  is the value of  that solves (17) and M1 > 0
is some arbitrarily chosen initial quantity of nominal money. If  < 1, the sequence
fMt =M1g1t=1 solves PM where M1 > 0 is again some arbitrarily chosen initial quantity
of nominal money.
According to Proposition 1, the sequence of money supplies fMt g1t=1 maximizes the
expected lifetime utilities of money agents. From this sequence, the optimal sequence of
take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers fQmt ; Xmt g1t=0 can be derived. The optimal sequence of money
o¤ered to the sellers in a match is
Xm0 =
M1
1 B;X
m
t =
(   1)Mt
1 B
1
t=1
(18)
where  =  if   1 and  = 1 if  < 1 and the optimal sequence of real commodities
demanded from the sellers is
Qm0 =
c
z (1 B)2 ; Q
m
t =
c (   1)
z (1 B)2
1
t=1
(19)
where c = c if   1 and c = ec if  < 1. To derive the optimal sequence of quantities
fQmt g1t=0, note that equation (1) implies that the sequence of shadow prices associated
with the sequence fMt g1t=1 is
n

0 =
kc
z(1 B)M1 , 


t =
kc
z(1 B)Mt
o1
t=1
. From this use (11) to
derive the sequence fQmt g1t=0.
Nonbinding announcements The time-inconsistency problem (possibly) associated
with the optimal sequences fMt g1t=1 is most clear if the optimal policy calls for a con-
stant money supply. With zero money growth, money agents consume Qm0 units of real
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commodities initially and nothing thereafter. From the perspective of the initial period,
this may be a good policy because zero ination increases consumption today. From the
perspective of the following period, initial consumption no longer enters the monopolists
considerations and the monopolist would like to sell additional money. Because of the
monopolists desire to deviate from the announced policy, many economists (e.g., Calvo
(1978), Taub (1985), Hellwig (1985), and White (1999)) conclude that when no binding an-
nouncement are feasible, revenue-maximizing policies are time-inconsistent and this rules
out any unregulated private organization of a market for at currency (Hellwig 1985 p.
581).10
The problem with this conclusion is that without specifying the demand for money after
each possible history of the game, the question of whether the announced sequence of money
supplies fMt g1t=1 is time-consistent or time-inconsistent cannot be answered. Knowledge
of the demand for money after each possible history is crucial because this determines
the monopolists expected stream of future revenues after each possible deviation.11 To
construct a monetary equilibrium, however, it is not necessary to describe the entire game
in detail; it is su¢ cient to show that a credible punishment strategy exists which eliminate
the monopolists desire to deviate from the announced policy.
For this purpose, denote 	 = fQmt ; Xmt g1t=0 the announced optimal sequence of
10Calvo (1978) was rst to point out the time-inconsistency problem of a revenue-maximizing money
supply sequence. The optimal solution fMt g1t=1 is time-consistent if for any t0, n, and t  t0 + n,
Mt (t0 + n) =M

t (t0). That is, the optimal solution is time-consistent if what is optimal to do in period
t from the vantage point of t0 is also optimal when the point of departure is t0 + n (see Calvo (1978) for
this denition).
11It is not surprising that the monopolists desire to deviate depends on her expectation of the demand
for money following any deviation. However, to my knowledge, with the exception of Cavalcanti and
Wallace (1999a and 1999b), the demand for money after out-of-equilibrium moves has not been studied
before. The details of the demand for money are also important to determine quantitively how much
the time-inconsistency problem accounts for periods of high ination in countries with poorly designed
monetary institutions.
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take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers dened by equations (18) and (19). To construct punishment
strategies, assume that the monopolists trading history is public information and let t
denote the monopolists trading history, where t contains each take-it-or-leave-it o¤er the
monopolist has made up to time t   1. Furthermore, let t denote the history of o¤ers
associated with the announced policy 	 and consider the history-dependent strategy  h = 
mt+1; c

t ; q

t ; x

t ; 

t ; 
m
t
1
t=0
where mt+1, c

t , q

t , and x

t solve the representative households
maximization problem described in Section 2, given the announced policy 	, and t and
mt are dened as follows:
t =
(
1 if t = 

t and Xt!t  kQt
0 otherwise
(20)
mt =
(
1 if t = 

t and fQmt ; Xmt g = fQmt ; Xmt g
0 otherwise
(21)
The acceptance rule (20) species a sellers behavior when matched with a buyer who
makes the take-it-or-leave-it o¤er fQt; Xtg. The seller accepts the o¤er if the monopolists
trading history, t, coincides with 

t , and if the surplus Xt!t   kQt is nonnegative. The
acceptance rule (21) species a sellers behavior when matched with a money agent who
makes the take-it-or-leave-it o¤er fQmt ; Xmt g. Again, the seller accepts the o¤er if the
monopolists trading history coincides with the announced plan, and if the monopolist
makes the equilibrium o¤er fQmt ; Xmt g. To proceed let   denote the strategy prole
consisting of each households strategy  h and let h	; i denote the strategy prole
consisting of the sequence of take-it-or-leave-it-o¤ers 	 and  .12
Proposition 2 The strategy prole h	; i is a subgame perfect monetary equilibrium.
12Note that h	; i is not a strategy prole in a strict sense because it does not specify the monopolists
and householdsactions if they observe an out-of-equilibrium move of a single household. However, because
the measure of a household is zero, I ignore deviations of households and focus on out-of-equilibrium moves
of the monopolist.
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Five comments are required here. First, any deviation by the monopolist triggers
complete autarky. That is, every seller in every subsequent meeting refuses to produce for
money. For each household it is optimal to respond to the revelation of defection by playing
autarky if all other agents respond likewise. Second, if  > 1, it is strictly optimal for
the monopolist to adhere to the announced policy because she can sell additional money
in each period. If   1, it is weakly optimal to adhere to the announced policy because
the monopolist is indi¤erent between adhering to the announced plan and any deviation.
Third, if the monopolist makes a deviating o¤er that yields a strictly positive surplus to
the sellers household at todays value of money, it is optimal for the seller not to accept
the o¤er because of the households belief that he cannot buy anything with the additional
money in the future. Fourth, household must revert to complete autarky whenever the
monopolist deviates. Households cannot just stop trading with the monopolist because
each household would have an incentive to deviate from such a punishment strategy by
accepting additional money from the monopolist. Fifth, in a more realistic information
structure, the monopolists past play would be revealed with a random delay. For example,
one could assume that each period the public record of the monopolists past transactions
is updated with probability  and that there is no updating with probability 1   . This
implies that the average updating lag is 1= periods. Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) use
such an information structure in a model where the past play of each agent is recorded
with a random lag.
4 Discussion and extensions
Since Barro and Gordon (1983) the central banking literature has extensively used pun-
ishment mechanisms to prevent public issuers of at currency from overissuing. In the
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central banking literature the markets punishment is to increase its ination expecta-
tion should the central bank overissue currency. In my model, the market simply refuses to
accept the currency should the private issuer deviate from the announced plan. One might
argue that such punishment strategies are unrealistic. However, there is no obvious reason
why punishment strategies should work for public issuers of at currency but not for a
private monopolist. Moreover, for many developing countries non-acceptability is the more
relevant threat even for public issuers of currency since agents can switch to an alternative
foreign currency such as the dollar.
There is little in the Barro and Gordon model that requires the central bank to be a
public issuer of currency. The only reason is that it cares about social welfare as opposed
to private welfare as the monopolist in my model. However, in the performance contract
models of Walsh (1995) and Fratianni et al. (1997) the central bank also cares about its
private welfare and not just social welfare.13 Performance contracts are written such that
maximizing the central banks self-interest also maximizes social welfare. One could in
principal adapt the model of the current paper along the same lines by introducing an
initial stage where the households o¤er the money issuing household an incentive contract
to prevent overissue.
The model shows that, as suggested by von Hayek (1976), punishment strategies ef-
fectively eliminate the time-inconsistency problem. Nevertheless, it also suggests that any
private organization of the market for at currency is suboptimal. The reason is that op-
timality requires a deation which is not consistent with positive prots once the initial
stock of money is sold since only positive ination rates generate the expected prots that
13Similarly, the conservativecentral bank literature argues for appointing a central banker who dislikes
ination more than the rest of society. See Waller (1992) for example.
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make the monopolist willing to adhere to his announced sequence of money supplies.14 It
is interesting to relate this result to the Su¤olk Bank of New England (182558). The
Su¤olk bank created a well-functioning interbank payment system and some authors (e.g.
Colomiris and Kahn (1996)) concluded from this example that unregulated competition
in the provision of payments services can produce an e¢ cient payments system. How-
ever, Rolnick et al. (1998) have questioned this view by showing that the Su¤olk Bank
earned extraordinary prots which in my model is inconsistent with an e¢ cient allocation
of resources.
This result questions von Hayeks (1976) argument that currency competition is socially
desirable. The reason is that there is a trade-o¤. On the one hand, if the currencies are
distinguishable, competition lowers the average rate of ination.15 On the other hand,
more competition lowers future prots which reduces the issuersincentives to adhere to
their announced sequences of money supplies.
The stability of the monetary system is another issue that arises with the private
provision of currency. In an environment without uncertainty about the behavior of the
monopolist punishment strategies work very e¤ectively to sustain the monetary equilibrium
because the slightest suspicion that an issuer is abusing his position will trigger autarky.
In an environment with uncertainty such suspicions can arise when they are false. In such
environments the monetary system is very fragile since it can collapse without real cause as
in the bank-run literature where a run on a bank can occur even when the bank is perfectly
14A public issuer of at currency can implement the rst-best allocation by following the Friedman
rule. This policy, however, requires that the public issuer can extract at currency from the economy.
Note also that the Friedman rule only improves the allocation relative to the best allocation consistent
with a monetary equilibrium in this model, if the cost of the tax system required to collect the currency
is su¢ ciently low.
15Here I assume that the competing issuers are involved in Cournot competition. In this case there exist
a monetary equilibrium where an increase in the number of issuers decreases the average rate of ination.
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sound.
Finally, the issue arises whether a private issuer would implement stabilization policies
that maximize societys welfare in an economy which is hit by aggregate real shocks. If
not, this could be another reason why most economies have opted for a monopolistic public
issuer of at currency and not a private prot-maximizing one.
5 Summary
This paper considers a monopolists revenue-maximizing supply of at currency in a random-
matching model with divisible money and divisible real commodities. When binding an-
nouncements are feasible, the monopolists policy is characterized by an initial period where
she initiates a currency reform which destroys the value of any old currency, and then issues
new money, which she taxes by a constant gross growth rate of money.
The paper shows that even in the absence of binding policy announcements, this
revenue-maximizing policy is time-consistent. The time-consistency of the monopolists
policy relies on the publics knowledge of the issuers trading history and on the existence
of a credible punishment strategy. The punishment strategy involves complete autarky
that is, each seller in every meeting refuses to produce for money. The punishment is
credible because for each household it is optimal to play autarky if all other household
respond likewise.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Note, rst, that condition (13) is nonbinding if
[u0 (c)  k] z (1 B)  k (1  )  1 (22)
Next, note that the right-hand side of (22) is strictly decreasing in , that the left-
hand side does not depend on , and that the solution to the second rst-order con-
dition is independent of . Thus, for any c there exists a critical value 1 such that
[u0 (c)  k] z (1 B) = k (1  1)  11 . Therefore, if   1, inequality (13) is non-
binding and the sequence fc0 = 0; ct = cg1t=1 satises the rst-order conditions (15) and
(16). The second-order condition for a maximum is satised because of the assumption
2u00 (c)+ cu000 (c) < 0 imposed on the curvature of the utility function. Thus, if   1, the
sequence fc0 = 0; ct = cg1t=1 solves PM .
If  < 1, inequality (13) is binding. As the rst-order condition (16) is strictly
decreasing in c, the optimal policy in this situation is ct = ec, for t > 0, where ec is the value
of c that satises (22) at equality. Thus, if  < 1, the sequence fc0 = 0; ct = ecg1t=1 solves
PM . The associated sequences of money supplies fMt = t 1M1g1t=1 and fMt =M1g1t=1,
respectively, are implied by equation (17). This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2: By applying the one-shot deviation principle, I rst show that
the strategy prole h	; i is a Nash equilibrium. First, consider any period t > 0.
If  > 1, the best response of the monopolist against  
 is fQmt ; Xmt g = fQmt ; Xmt g
because fQmt ; Xmt g 6= fQmt ; Xmt g yields zero revenue, not only in period t, but in any of
the following periods, and fQmt ; Xmt g = fQmt ; Xmt g yields a positive revenue, not only in
period t, but in any of the subsequent periods. If   1, it is weakly optimal to chose
fQmt ; Xmt g = fQmt ; Xmt g against   because any deviation as well as the equilibrium
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strategy yields zero revenue today and in the future. Thus, fQmt ; Xmt g = fQmt ; Xmt g,
t > 0, is a best response against  . Next, consider the best response in some period t > 0
of the representative household h against the strategy prole


	;  h

where   h denotes
the strategy prole consisting of the equilibrium strategies of all other households. If all
other households accept monetary exchanges and the monopolists strategy is 	, then it
is a best response to accept money in exchange for real commodities at date t. Therefore,
neither the monopolist nor the household has a protable deviation in any period t > 0.
Next, consider the initial period. Given  , the solution to the monopolists maximization
problem PM implies that 	 is a best response against   and, by the same reasoning as
above,  h is a best response against


	;  h

. Thus, I conclude that the strategy prole
h	; i is a Nash equilibrium.
Next, I show that the strategy prole h	; i is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
While doing so, I focus on out-of-equilibrium moves of the monopolist because the measure
of a single household is zero and, therefore, deviations of a single household are irrelevant.
Consider any out-of-equilibrium move fQmt ; Xmt g 6= fQmt ; Xmt g at some date t > 0. If
fQmt ; Xmt g 6= fQmt ; Xmt g, all households reject money subsequently. Thus, the subgame
that starts in the period following this deviation is the autarky equilibrium, and it is well
known that the autarky equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of this subgame, in fact, of
any subgame, including the whole game. If other households do not accept money, the
best response for household h is not to accept money. Moreover, this best response is
independent of the nature of the deviation of the monopolist. 
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